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CLAPPER V. AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL: WHO HAS
STANDING TO CHALLENGE
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE?
ELISA SIELSKI
I. INTRODUCTION
1

In Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Supreme Court will
decide whether plaintiffs in the United States have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the FISA Amendment Act of 2008
2
(FAA). The standing issue in this case arises in the context of foreign
intelligence and national security. The FAA broadens the
government’s ability to conduct electronic surveillance of
communications. Primarily, the FAA focuses on monitoring
communications between persons in foreign countries, although
3
domestic communications may be intercepted unintentionally.
Amnesty International et al., Plaintiffs in this case, claim that the
FAA violates the guarantee of judicial review established by Article
III of the Constitution and is in violation of principles of separation of
powers because, by limiting review of specific searches, it restricts the
4
FISA Court’s power of judicial review to general programs enacted
5
under the FAA. Plaintiffs also claim that the FAA violates their right
to free speech under the First Amendment and their right to due


J.D. Candidate, 2014, Duke University School of Law.
1. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, No. 11-2025 (U.S. argued Oct. 29, 2011).
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), Pub.
L. No. 110–261, 122 Stat. 2436, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881.
3. See FAA § 702, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(d) (West 2012) (requiring the Attorney General,
in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to adopt procedures reasonably
designed to avoid targeting of persons within the United States. This assumes that despite
reasonable precautions, some domestic person may nonetheless be targeted inadvertently).
4. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. 95–511, 92 Stat.
1783, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803. The legislation created a special court (the “FISA Court”) to
oversee actions undertaken under FISA. The legislation also established a process for
authorization and review of actions under FISA.
5. See Brief in Opposition at 14 n.9, Clapper, No. 11-1025 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2012).
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process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it authorizes
6
warrantless surveillance of United States citizens. Here, however, the
Supreme Court is faced with the narrower issue of whether Plaintiffs
can challenge the constitutionality of the FAA based on the mere risk
that communications in the United States may be monitored under
the FAA, even if Plaintiffs have no evidence that their
communications are actually being monitored.
II. FACTS
In 2008, legal, labor, human rights, and media organizations, along
with attorneys and journalists, brought an action challenging the
constitutionality of the portion of the FAA that established section
7
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Plaintiffs
claim that section 702 gives sweeping and unmonitored powers to the
government to conduct surveillance on Americans’ international
communications in violation of Article III of the Constitution, the
principle of separation of powers, and Plaintiffs’ First and Fourth
8
Amendment constitutional rights. Plaintiffs seek a declaration of
9
unconstitutionality and an injunction against the use of section 702.
Section 702 of the FAA amends the procedures for surveillance
10
first established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
creating new procedures for authorizing surveillance of non-United
11
States citizens outside of the United States. The changes include
abolishing the requirement of individualized orders and diminishing
12
the role of the FISA Court. Under the new FAA procedures, the

6. Id. at 14.
7. Amnesty Int’l v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 643–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
8. Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 14.
9. Id.
10. FISA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f) (West 2012). FISA was originally enacted in 1978 to
regulate surveillance of communications for foreign intelligence purposes between persons in
the United States and between persons in the United States and persons abroad.
11. Compare 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a (West 2012) (describing the procedures for
authorization for the electronic surveillance “of persons reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States”), with 50 U.S.C.A § 1805 (West 2012) (describing the findings that a
judge must make in order to issue an order authorizing general electronic surveillance).
12. Section 1881a requires the government to obtain FISA Court approval of (1)
government certification regarding the proposed surveillance, and (2) targeting and
minimization procedures to be used. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a. Certification requires that the
Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence attest that the surveillance complies
with the Fourth Amendment, does not target persons known to be located in the United States,
and creates adequate procedures to restrain the acquisition and dissemination of information
about people within the United States. Id.
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FISA Court merely approves certifications rather than finding
probable cause for monitoring, as it did under the older FISA
13
procedures. Moreover, the FAA restricts the FISA Court to ex ante
review of an investigation, while authorizing the Attorney General
and the Director of National Intelligence to direct continuous
ongoing review of both the substance and process underlying the
14
investigation.
According to Plaintiffs, the changes that the FAA made to FISA
15
give rise to violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Plaintiffs
explain that the FAA allows authorization of surveillance of foreign
targets based on any information deemed by the government to be
16
foreign-intelligence information. Plaintiffs further explain that their
jobs require them to engage in communications with foreign contacts
regarding matters that could be deemed related to foreign17
intelligence information. Consequently, Plaintiffs fear that their
international communications will be intercepted under FAA
authorization. They claim that, as a consequence of this fear, they
have taken costly measures to protect against interception. These
measures include traveling to meet contacts in person and avoiding
18
email communications.
19
Both parties filed for summary judgment. Plaintiffs sought an
injunctive order prohibiting the Government from conducting
13. Compare 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (West 2012) (requiring, under FISA, that the
judge determine that the target of surveillance is a “foreign power,” and noting that a United
States person cannot be a “foreign power” or agent thereof when his actions are protected by
the First Amendment), with 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(i)(3) (requiring, under the FAA, that the
Court enter an order approving the certification when the request for certification complies with
certification requirements).
14. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (authorizing review of surveillance process
and minimization procedures before surveillance starts); id. § 1881a(l)(1) (requiring the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to review compliance with targeting
and minimization procedures every six months).
15. Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 1.
16. Id. at 8.
17. Id. at 15–19. Plaintiffs are attorneys, journalists, and human rights and labor
organizations who are in constant contact with clients and witnesses abroad. Id. Journalists and
human rights and labor organization plaintiffs claim that fear of surveillance inhibits their ability
to cultivate new sources or obtain information from family members and potential clients. Id.
Attorney-plaintiffs suffer from an added burden: they have a professional obligation to make
sure that communications with clients are confidential. Id. As long as there is a possibility that
their communications can be monitored, they are under an obligation to take additional
measures to ensure the confidentiality of their communications. Id.
18. Id. at 1617.
19. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 2431 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2012) (No. 11-2025).
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20

surveillance under the FAA; the Government argued that Plaintiffs
21
lacked standing to challenge the facial validity of the FAA. The
district court for the Southern District of New York agreed, holding
that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not have a “personal,
particularized, concrete injury in fact” and were not “subject to” the
22
FAA. The district court found that Plaintiffs’ fear that their
communications would be monitored was merely speculative and only
23
“subjective[ly] chill[ed]” Plaintiffs’ rights. The Second Circuit
reversed, holding that Plaintiffs have standing “[b]ecause standing
may be based on a reasonable fear of future injury and costs incurred
24
to avoid that injury.” The Government petitioned for en banc review,
25
but was denied by a six-to-six vote.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Article III of the Constitution empowers the federal courts to
26
hear only “cases” and “controversies.” Standing doctrine exists to
determine whether a plaintiff has shown a “case” between himself and
27
the defendant that warrants resolution by the court on the merits. A
plaintiff must show that he has “a personal stake in the outcome” of
28
the case or controversy. To that end, the plaintiff must show the
three elements of standing: (1) that the plaintiff has suffered an
injury-in-fact, (2) that a causal connection exists between the injury
and the challenged statute, and (3) that a decision is likely to redress
29
the injury.
An injury-in-fact may be present and ongoing, or based on
30
prospective government action. The plaintiff must show that the
injury, committed under the scope of the implicated statute, affects
31
the plaintiff in an individualized way. Future injuries based on

20. Id.
21. Amnesty Int’l v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 643–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Amnesty Int’l USA, 638 F.3d at 122.
25. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
27. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
28. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (holding that an adversarial presentation of
the case “sharpens the presentation of the issues” in a way that leads to the best resolution of
the constitutional question).
29. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 560 n.1.
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prospective government action are only injuries-in-fact when they
32
reach a certain threshold of likelihood. The plaintiff cannot assert a
future injury based on a subjective fear that he will be affected by the
33
government action. Instead, he must show that the threat of injury is
not merely “conjectural or hypothetical” but rather “real and
34
immediate.” Nevertheless, the anticipation of future injury may itself
be a present injury-in-fact and be sufficient to warrant standing if the
35
plaintiff can show that the anticipation is not speculative.
Anticipation of future injury qualifies as present injury when the
threat of government action causes the plaintiff to refrain from some
36
protected action (such as speech) or when it deprives the plaintiff of
benefits he was expecting to incur (such as protection from liability or
37
competitiveness in the market).
A plaintiff must also show that there is a causal nexus between his
38
injury and the conduct being challenged. Yet, a plaintiff can assert a
legal right even if he is not the target of a defendant’s action or when
39
his injury is not a direct product of the defendant’s action. In such a
scenario, a plaintiff can establish injury-in-fact by showing that he has
altered or ceased constitutionally protected conduct as a reasonable
40
response to the government action. The plaintiff must also show that
41
his injury would be redressed by a favorable court decision. The
42
judicial remedy sought must directly correct the plaintiff’s injury.

32. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 n.8 (1983); accord Curtis v. City of New
Haven, 726 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he critical inquiry is the likelihood that the plaintiffs
will be . . . assaulted.” (emphasis added)).
33. See id. at 107 n.8. (“It is the reality of the threat of . . . injury that is relevant to the
standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions.” (emphasis in original)). A
“subjective chill” is not enough to warrant standing. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972).
34. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974).
35. See id. at 498 (explaining that plaintiffs do not have standing when the possibility that
they will be charged under the challenged statute is only speculative).
36. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476–77 (1987) (holding that the necessity of going
on the record to request political literature injures a First Amendment right).
37. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 426 (1998) (holding that even when a
future outcome is speculative it can create present injury by depriving the plaintiff of a present
opportunity).
38. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973).
39. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (“[W]hen the plaintiff is not
himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded,
but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”).
40. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184–85 (2000).
41. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
42. See Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618 (explaining that the legal remedy sought by the
plaintiff, an injunction against the district attorney for refusing to prosecute the child’s father,
would not cause the father to pay child support and redress the plaintiff’s injury).
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The Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing to challenge
43
government surveillance in Laird v. Tatum. There, the United States
Army established a program that compiled information about public
44
political activities that had the potential to cause civil disorder. The
45
information collected was readily available to the public. The
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the program, asserting
that Army surveillance of their protests imposed a “chilling effect” on
46
the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. The Court held that the
47
plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the program. The Court
explained that a “chilling effect” does not arise merely from the
knowledge of the existence of a surveillance program that potentially
48
targets the plaintiffs. Rather, plaintiffs must present evidence that
the program was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in a way that
49
would injure the plaintiffs directly. The Court held that the Laird
plaintiffs did not meet this test because the plaintiffs did not alter
50
their conduct in response to government surveillance. Consequently,
the plaintiffs could show only a subjective chill rather than a direct
51
injury, which is not enough.
Although Laird addressed the test for standing in government
surveillance cases, the circuits are split as to whether Laird established
a separate standard for standing in surveillance cases. Some circuits
interpret Laird to establish a heightened standard for plaintiffs who
wish to bring a First Amendment claim in response to government
surveillance. More precisely, both the Sixth and D.C. Circuits have
held that Laird precludes standing in cases of government
surveillance when the plaintiff is not the target of the regulation and
52
can show only a “subjective chill” of protected rights. Before

43. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id. at 9.
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 11.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id. at 13–14 (“[A] subjective ‘chill’ [is] not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific
present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”). A “subjective chill” occurs when a
governmental activity restrains a plaintiff in such a way that he is deterred from engaging in
constitutionally protected activities due to fear of repercussion. Id. at 11.
52. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 661 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the relevant factor is
the level of restraint on the plaintiffs, “and ‘chilling’ is not sufficient restraint no matter how
valuable the speech”); United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he ‘chilling effect’ which is produced by their fear of being subjected to
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granting standing, these circuits would first require that the plaintiff
be directly “regulated, constrained, or compelled” by the government
53
action. The First and Ninth Circuits, however, have held that Laird
allows for standing in cases where the plaintiff can show that the
challenged government conduct has reasonably led the plaintiff to
alter his conduct, even if he was not directly targeted by the
54
regulation. In Clapper, the Court will likely address the proper
standard for standing in First Amendment government surveillance
cases and resolve the circuit split.
IV. DECISION BELOW
In the decision below, a Second Circuit panel unanimously held
that Plaintiffs had fulfilled the three requirements of standing: injuryin-fact, a causal connection between the injury and the challenged
55
statute, and redressability. The court first analyzed whether Plaintiffs
56
had proven concrete injury. Plaintiffs argued two grounds for injury:
(1) fear that their communications would be monitored created a
future injury and (2) the burdens and expenses incurred to protect
57
their communications created a present injury.
The Second Circuit explained that to prove future injury, Plaintiffs
had to show that the “FAA creates an objectively reasonable
likelihood that the plaintiffs’ communications are being or will be
58
monitored under the FAA.” According to the court, if Plaintiffs’
“reasonable enough” interpretation of the statute leads to a
59
legitimate fear of enforcement, then Plaintiffs have standing.

illegal surveillance and which deters them from conducting constitutionally protected activities,
is foreclosed as a basis for standing by the Supreme Court’s holding in Laird.”).
53. See NSA, 493 F.3d at 661 (“[T]o allege a sufficient injury under the First Amendment,
a plaintiff must establish that he or she is regulated, constrained, or compelled directly by the
government’s actions, instead of by his or her own subjective chill.”).
54. See Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that Laird does not preclude standing when government surveillance causes a “distinct
and palpable” injury); Ozonoff v. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224, 230 (1st Cir. 1984) (explaining that the
issue is “whether the [regulation] reasonably leads [the plaintiff] to believe he must conform his
conduct to its standards”).
55. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 2431 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2012) (No. 11-2025).
56. Id. at 133–34.
57. Id. at 133.
58. Id. at 134.
59. Id. at 137 (citing Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 383 (2d Cir.
2000)).

SIELSKI FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

58

1/14/2013 3:23 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 8

Upon examination of Plaintiffs’ asserted future injury, the court
decided that Plaintiffs had shown that the broad monitoring allowed
60
by the FAA would likely include Plaintiffs’ communications. The
FAA was enacted to broaden the government’s powers under FISA
to monitor communications related to foreign-intelligence
61
information. The Plaintiffs’ communications were likely to be within
the scope of communications monitored by the FAA because
Plaintiffs’ foreign contacts are apt to be targets of surveillance—their
contacts include individuals who are believed to be associated with
terrorist groups, activists who oppose governments supported by the
U.S. government, and people located in areas of interest to the U.S.
62
government. The court concluded that Plaintiffs’ fears were “fairly
traceable to FAA because they are based on a reasonable
interpretation of the challenged statute and a realistic understanding
63
of the world.”
Moreover, according to the Second Circuit, the requirements of
64
FISA Court authorization did not preclude Plaintiffs’ standing. The
court explained that the presence of intervening steps does not
65
preclude standing unless there is a significant intervening step. Only
a step that attenuates the connection between the defendant’s action
and the plaintiff’s harm, based on the uncertainty of its completion,
66
would be significant enough to defeat standing. The intervening
67
steps presented here do not fall under that category. Here, it is
reasonable to expect that the government will seek the authorization
68
for surveillance. It is also reasonably certain that the FISA Court will
69
approve the request. FISA Court authorization requires only a
certification that the request for surveillance complies with basic
procedural requirements and not a substantive analysis of each
request. Moreover, after the FAA was enacted, only one request for
70
authorization was denied by the FISA Court. Because it is

60. Id. at 138.
61. See id. (citing 154 CONG. REC. 769, 771 (2008) (noting that the FAA was passed
specifically to permit surveillance that was not permitted by FISA)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 139.
64. Id. at 139–40.
65. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–26 (2007)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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reasonable to expect that the government would (1) apply for
authorization for surveillance and (2) acquire that authorization from
the FISA Court, the court stated that the certification is not a
71
significant intervening step.
The Second Circuit thus held that Plaintiffs had a concrete fear of
a future injury that was causally connected to the FAA. Thus,
Plaintiffs had sufficiently shown that their imminent future injury was
72
injury-in-fact for the purposes of standing.
Next, the court determined that Plaintiffs had standing based on
73
present injury-in-fact. The court explained that when the
anticipation of future injury causes present economic harm, there is
74
injury-in-fact sufficient to establish the injury element of standing.
The court further noted that even if the injury is self-inflicted, it is still
sufficient for the purposes of standing as long as Plaintiffs’ actions are
75
reasonable responses to a concrete fear of future injury. After
concluding that Plaintiffs’ fear of monitoring under the FAA was
reasonable, the court held that Plaintiffs’ fear was concrete enough to
76
warrant a finding of present injury. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ undisputed
factual record showed that they incurred costs in a direct attempt to
77
protect their communications from monitoring via the FAA.
Because there was a concrete present injury directly connected to the
78
FAA, the court held that Plaintiffs had standing.
The court also held that despite not having been directly subject
to government action, Plaintiffs had standing because the FAA
79
reasonably caused them to alter their conduct. The court held that
Plaintiffs had shown that if the FAA can reasonably be expected to
lead to monitoring of Plaintiffs’ communications, the monitoring may
lead to additional injuries such as potential harm to clients and breach

71. Id.
72. Id. at 140.
73. Id. at 133.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 134 (holding that when plaintiffs can show that “it was not unreasonable for
them to incur cost out of fear” of interception, then measures taken support standing, but
measures do not support standing when the “possibility of interception is remote or fanciful”).
76. See id. (“[T]he line of future-injury standing cases provides a helpful framework for
analyzing plaintiffs’ present-injury arguments.”).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 139–40.
79. See id. at 143–45 (explaining that when it is reasonable for a plaintiff to fear
surveillance, there is standing if the measures the plaintiff took were a reasonable response to
that fear).
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80

of Plaintiff’s’ ethical responsibilities. Therefore, the court reasoned,
in a reasonable effort to avoid those injuries, Plaintiffs avoided
electronic communication or traveled long distances to meet with
81
their clients. Because Plaintiffs had to choose between being
monitored and incurring costs, the court found that they had the
necessary “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” to
82
warrant standing.
The Second Circuit further held that the standard for standing in
issues of government surveillance programs follows traditional
83
standing doctrine. It remarked that Laird did not create a stricter
standard by declining to confer standing when the plaintiffs claimed
that the surveillance program inflicted a “subjective chill” on
84
plaintiffs’ rights. Instead, the Second Circuit stated that the Laird
85
decision was limited to the facts presented in the case. The Second
Circuit noted that the Laird plaintiffs did not have standing because
they were not directly subject to the statute and they could not show
86
that the surveillance program caused them to alter their conduct.
Unlike in Laird, Plaintiffs in the case at hand had shown that they had
87
altered their conduct in response to the FAA. Because the court did
not create a stricter standard for standing in Laird, the Second Circuit
concluded that Laird did not preclude standing for Amnesty
88
International and its fellow plaintiffs.
V. ARGUMENTS
The main arguments presented by both parties focus on whether
Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that they have suffered either a
future injury or a present injury as a result of the FAA. The
89
Government asserts that Plaintiffs have not proven future injury.
The Government argues that future injury claims are subject to an
“imminence” standard and that the connection between the FAA and

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
2012).

Id. at 143–44.
Id.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 146–47.
Id. at 148–49.
Brief for the Petitioners at 27, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, No. 11-1025 (U.S. July 26,
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Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries is insufficient to meet this standard.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue they can prove future injury
because their injuries meet the standard of “reasonable likelihood of
91
future harm.”
The Government also challenges the Second Circuit’s holding
92
regarding present injury. The Government asserts that Plaintiffs’
injuries are not enough to satisfy the standing requirement because
they are merely self-imposed responses to a “subjective chill” of
93
Plaintiffs’ rights. Finally, the Government argues that a judicial
remedy would not redress Plaintiffs’ injuries because the Government
94
has other ways to monitor communications. Plaintiffs reply that their
injuries are only self-inflicted because they had no other options to
95
protect their communications. Plaintiffs also note that although
other methods of surveillance are available to the Government,
Plaintiffs need only prove that a judicial remedy would redress some
96
of their injuries.
A. The Future Injury Claim
1. The Government’s Attack on the Standard Adopted by the
Second Circuit
The Government argues that the Second Circuit adopted the
97
wrong standard for injury-in-fact in cases of future injury. According
to the Government, the standard adopted by the Second Circuit
impermissibly allows standing to be based on “speculative assertions
98
of possible future harm,” and the proper standard only allows
99
An
standing when threatened future injury is imminent.
“imminence” standard requires Plaintiffs to prove that the acquisition
of their communications is “certainly impending” as a result of the
100
Government’s challenged action. Thus, the Government argues, the
Second Circuit’s standard strays significantly from that imposed by

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 25.
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 89, at 35.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 45.
Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 37.
Id. at 49–50.
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 89, at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 24 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
Id. at 19.
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the Laird Court in a way that dilutes the requirement of an
101
individualized factual presentation of the case; because the nexus
between the statute and the injury to Plaintiffs is not sufficiently clear,
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Government action will be too abstract
102
and lacking a personal, factual basis. Abstract challenges to
regulations cross over the fine line between personal challenges and
103
advisory opinions.
The Government asserts that if the correct standard were applied,
Plaintiffs’ injuries would be insufficient to warrant standing because
their claimed future injury is based on mere conjecture about the
104
possibility of any injury caused by future government action.
According to the Government, Plaintiffs are not the targets of the
FAA and thus they cannot positively show that their communications
are subject to certainly impending interception by surveillance
105
authorized under the FAA. That the Government might target
Plaintiffs’ foreign contacts and might accidentally intercept protected
106
communications is pure speculation. It is also speculative, from the
Government’s perspective, to claim that the Government will monitor
Plaintiffs’ conversations using FAA authorization, as opposed to
107
other authorized means of monitoring.
Moreover, if the
Government decides to use the FAA to monitor Plaintiffs’ foreign
clients’ communications, it is unclear whether it would acquire FISA
108
Court authorization. Because the Plaintiffs cannot show, with a
sufficient level of certainty, that they are subject to any injury-in-fact,
the Government believes that Plaintiffs’ future injury claims are
109
insufficient for the purposes of standing.
2. Plaintiffs’ Reply
Plaintiffs assert that the standard for future harm encompasses the
110
threat of surveillance at issue in the case. They argue that the
appropriate standard for injury-in-fact requires only a “reasonable
101. Id. at 24.
102. Id. at 35.
103. See id. (explaining that one of the foundations of the American judicial system is its
adversary nature and its general prohibition on advisory opinions).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 23.
106. Id. at 30–31.
107. Id. at 31–32.
108. Id. at 33.
109. Id. at 29.
110. Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 24–25.
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likelihood of future harm” and a “realistic danger” that injury will
111
occur. This standard requires only that the plaintiff show a
reasonable and substantial likelihood that his injury will come to
112
pass. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that requiring future plaintiffs to
prove with immediate certainty that their communications are being
113
monitored would effectively preclude any challenge to the FAA.
Foreign-intelligence monitoring is generally done in secret, without
any prior announcement to the targeted persons. Accordingly, it is
unlikely that any particular plaintiff would be able to show with
individualized, immediate certainty that his communications are being
114
monitored.
Plaintiffs assert that they have shown a sufficient threat of future
115
harm to support injury-in-fact. They argue that it is undisputed that
the Government uses the FAA to monitor foreign communications,
and that Plaintiffs’ communications with their foreign clients are
precisely the type and kind of information monitored under the
116
FAA.
Thus, the Government is likely to monitor Plaintiffs’
117
communications through the FAA surveillance process. If the FAA
is used as envisioned, it is reasonable for Plaintiffs to fear that their
communications with foreign contacts are reasonably likely to or are
118
in realistic danger of being monitored. Thus, Plaintiffs argue, they
have shown sufficient fear of future injury to satisfy the injury-in-fact
119
requirement.

111. Id. at 55–56 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 190 (2000); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).
112. See id. at 56 (challenging the Government’s argument that the standard of “certainly
impending” requires more than a realistic threat, and arguing that the two standards have been
used interchangeably to require a substantial likelihood of injury).
113. Id. at 57.
114. Id. at 57–58.
115. Id. at 53–54.
116. Id. at 53; see also id. at 30 (arguing that the changes brought by the FAA enable the
Government to conduct broader monitoring programs that reach communications with
individuals within the United States because the FAA does not require the Government to
specify who will be monitored when applying for authorization).
117. Id. at 53–54.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 54.
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B. The Present Injury Claim
1. The Government Challenges the Present Harm as Self-Inflicted
and Subjective
The Government contends that Plaintiffs do not have standing
because self-imposed injuries are not sufficient to warrant Article III
120
standing. Plaintiffs have failed to show that they have suffered
121
injuries resulting from the Government’s challenged conduct. In
fact, Plaintiffs can avoid the consequent expenditures without judicial
intervention. Plaintiffs elected to spend that money on measures to
avoid monitoring and could have, instead, chosen not to take those
122
measures. Granting standing in this situation would treat those who
choose to inflict injury on themselves more favorably than similarly
situated parties who do not choose to self-inflict injuries, allowing
123
uninjured individuals to manufacture injury-in-fact.
Moreover, the Government argues that Plaintiffs’ altered
behavior, allegedly a reaction to their fear of future harm, is merely a
“subjective chill” and not a sufficient substitute for the required
124
injury-in-fact. The Government notes that Laird establishes that a
plaintiff must show more than a “subjective chill” to fulfill the injury125
in-fact requirement in government surveillance cases. Because
Plaintiffs cannot show that they feared imminent and concrete
interception of their communications, they cannot show more than a
126
subjective chill and, consequently, cannot point to any injury-in-fact.
The Government also contends, in the alternative, that even if selfinflicted injury were sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement, Plaintiffs did not show that their injury could be
127
redressed by a favorable court decision. Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries
would have to be redressed by an injunction because the injuries stem
from the threat that the Government may monitor their foreign
128
contacts’ communications. However, the Government may choose
not to monitor those communications via FAA authorization; rather,

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 89, at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 44.
Id.
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the Government may choose any of the several alternative ways of
129
monitoring foreign persons for foreign-intelligence purposes. It is
therefore speculative to suggest that an injunction against the use of
the FAA would prevent monitoring of Plaintiffs’ communications
130
with foreign contacts. Plaintiffs have not shown that the judicial
131
remedy sought would redress their injury.
2. Plaintiffs’ Reply
Plaintiffs contend that the FAA is causing them “actual and
132
ongoing professional and economic harm.” They argue that they
have concrete rather than conjectural injuries because they have been
forced to take costly measures (such as traveling abroad and avoiding
telephone and email) to avert the risk of having their protected
133
communications intercepted. The FAA has also impaired Plaintiffs’
ability to find additional contacts, witnesses, and sources abroad
because such sources refuse to share information that they would
134
otherwise share. Plaintiffs explain that the actions they have taken
in response to the FAA were necessary and sometimes required by
135
various professional rules of confidentiality. For example, journalistplaintiffs cannot maintain sources or gain new sources if there is the
136
possibility that their conversations are being monitored. The
attorney-plaintiffs are required by ABA Rules of Professional
Conduct to protect their clients’ privacy at all costs; they cannot allow
137
their communications with clients to be monitored.
Thus, their actions are only self-inflicted insofar as they could have
chosen not to protect their communications and instead accept the
138
damage to their personal and professional reputations. Plaintiffs
contend that they have taken action to avoid concrete injury that
would otherwise be inflicted by the Government through the
challenged conduct. Such injury is sufficient for standing if the injury

129. Id. at 45.
130. Id. at 46.
131. Id. at 46–47.
132. Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 28–29.
133. Id. at 27, 29.
134. Id. at 29.
135. See, e.g., id. at 34 (explaining attorney-plaintiffs’ ethical requirements under the Rules
of Professional Conduct).
136. Id. at 29.
137. Id. at 34–35.
138. Id. at 37.
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139

is traceable to the statute. Because Plaintiffs’ injuries were a direct
reaction to the FAAthe scope of the FAA allows government
monitoring to reach Plaintiffs’ communications with sourcesthe
economic injuries inflicted on Plaintiffs are directly traceable to the
140
FAA.
Plaintiffs also contend that their injuries are justiciable under the
141
Laird standard. They argue that Laird does not require plaintiffs
who are attempting to prove substantiality of injury to show that their
142
communications have already been monitored. The Laird plaintiffs
lacked standing because their complaint challenged the existence of
143
the government program without any demonstration of injury. The
Laird Court explained that had plaintiffs alleged present objective
144
harm, the Court might have found grounds for standing. Plaintiffs in
the case at hand, however, took costly measures to avoid monitoring
145
and therefore allege a present objective harm.
Moreover, Plaintiffs believe that their injuries would be redressed
146
by a favorable judgment. Plaintiffs do not have to prove that the
same injury cannot be inflicted by alternative monitoring methods.
They simply must show that the judgment will redress “a discrete
147
injury.” The Court has previously held that the standing requirement
148
is satisfied when judgment only partially addresses the injury. In
fact, it is enough that the relief sought would be a “first step” toward
149
redressing the injury. Plaintiffs also argue that the FAA imposes

139. Id.
140. Id. at 35–36.
141. Id. at 46–47.
142. Id. at 46.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 47–48.
146. Id. at 48.
147. Id. at 48–49 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982)).
148. Id. at 49–50. Plaintiffs cite a series of cases in which plaintiffs sought to enjoin just one
of multiple offenders from engaging in the offending conduct: Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 523–24 (2007) (holding that even though enjoining the EPA to regulate greenhouse
emissions would not reverse global warming, it would be a step toward reducing global
warming); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476 (1987) (holding that an injunction against the use
of the words “political propaganda” would “at least partially address” the injury to the
plaintiff); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 62 (1978) (holding that
although the defendant was only one of many nuclear power plants that could cause
radioactivity, the defendant was the one causing the plaintiffs’ fear of increased radioactivity in
the air, water, and property).
149. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524 (explaining that resolution of the full injury
may take incremental steps that address one problem at a time).
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more burdens than other statutes authorizing electronic monitoring
because it allows for sweeping and unrestricted monitoring without
150
constant judicial review. The lack of judicial oversight increases
Plaintiffs’ fear of monitoring and thereby increases the harm caused
by the FAA. As a consequence, an injunction against the Government
151
would directly redress Plaintiffs’ injuries.
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
The Court is likely to affirm the Second Circuit’s holding because
Plaintiffs may have just enough “skin in the game” to survive standing
scrutiny. Because the statute does not directly target Plaintiffs, the
Court will only address the issue of whether Plaintiffs have provided
sufficient factual proof evidencing the individualized effect of
152
government monitoring under the FAA.
The Court is likely to hold that proof of injury-in-fact requires
153
that Plaintiffs show that the FAA causes a reasonable fear of injury.
In cases of government surveillance, requiring that plaintiffs show that
they have already been monitored would preclude adjudication of a
statute’s constitutionality because the government is not likely to
154
disclose specific targets of foreign-intelligence surveillance. Thus,
Plaintiffs will not have to show that they will be injureda standard
that is effectively impossible to meetrather, they need only show
155
that it is reasonable for them to fear surveillance under the FAA.
Plaintiffs can show reasonable fear because the FAA has an
expansive scope. Even communications that do not fall directly within
156
the statute’s scope can still be unintentionally intercepted. The
Court is likely to view the enumeration of the type of

150. Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 51.
151. Id.
152. The FAA was enacted to permit surveillance of communications outside the United
States on matters of foreign intelligence. 154 CONG. REC. 769, 771 (2008). Since Plaintiffs are
within the United States, they do not directly fall under the scope of the FAA.
153. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 n.8 (1983) (“It is the reality of the
threat of repeated injury that is relevant . . . .” (emphasis in original)).
154. Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 57–58.
155. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190
(2000).
156. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(d)(1) (West 2012) (requiring that minimization
procedures be set in place to ensure that there is no excessive unintentional monitoring of
communications between persons in the United States). The very inclusion of minimization
procedures indicates that the drafters of the FAA understood that some domestic
communications will be monitored incident to the surveillance explicitly allowed by the statute.
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communications that can be “picked up” as sufficient evidence of the
individualized effect of the FAA on Plaintiffs, despite the fact that
Plaintiffs are not the primary targets of the FAA. Thus, the Court will
likely hold that because there is a “reasonable danger” that Plaintiffs’
communications will be monitored under the FAA, the threat of
future injury suffices to establish injury-in-fact.
To prove ongoing injury, the Court is likely to require that
Plaintiffs show that, faced with the threat of injury, they took action to
avoid the injury. Plaintiffs have shown that in order to avoid
monitoring, they modified their conduct and, as a result, incurred
157
costs. Although Plaintiffs’ injuries were arguably “self-inflicted,”
those injuries were the result of a Hobson’s choice: Plaintiffs had to
either incur the costs of avoiding FAA monitoring or decline to take
measures to protect communications and suffer any resulting
158
reputational and professional consequences. When a plaintiff is
forced to make a choice between relinquishing a protected
constitutional right on the one hand, and a less grievous self-inflicted
injury on the other, the plaintiff should have the right to challenge the
159
offending statute.
Moreover, the Court is likely to hold that Laird does not preclude
justiciability for the case at hand. Although Laird held that plaintiffs
did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
government surveillance program because their injury was only a
“subjective chill” of their rights, it is unlikely that the Court will hold
that Laird created a new standard for standing. The issue in Laird
pertained to two of the fundamental requirements of standing: (1)
whether plaintiffs could show any injury-in-fact, and (2) whether the
injury was incurred as a result of the challenged government
160
conduct. Although Laird did address the issue of future or “fearbased” injuries, it arguably did not heighten the existing standing
standards for injuries arising from a government surveillance
161
program. Laird merely applied, albeit narrowly, the established

157. See Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 29 (noting, for example, that Plaintiffs
travelled abroad to gather information instead of using phone or email).
158. Id. at 37.
159. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476–77 (1987) (holding that a plaintiff who faces the
choice of refraining from a protected action or suffering injury has the right to challenge the
government action in question).
160. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1972).
161. See Brian Calabrese, Fear-Based Standing: Cognizing an Injury-in-Fact, 603 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1445, 1456–57 (2011) (explaining that Laird is the leading case on fear-based
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requirements of standing in the context of government surveillance
programs.
Additionally, the Court is likely to hold that Plaintiffs have shown
that their injury can be redressed by a favorable judgment.
Established standing doctrine does not require a plaintiff to show that
162
the remedy sought will perfectly redress all of his injuries. The
plaintiff need only show that the injunction will provide some
163
measure of relief. Plaintiffs have shown that they fear monitoring
164
because of the FAA’s extraordinary breadth. Thus, requiring that
the Government be prohibited from using the FAA to conduct
electronic surveillance would provide some measure of relief.
Additionally, to deny standing because the Government has other
165
means available to infringe on Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights would
insulate any duplicative government programs from any
166
constitutional challenge. Thus, the Court is likely to hold that
Plaintiffs have fulfilled the requirements of standing.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs here may have just enough personal interest to
satisfy the standing inquiry. Plaintiffs can show future injury based on
a standard that requires a reasonable fear of injury because the FAA
is broad enough to encompass Plaintiffs’ communications. Plaintiffs
can also show that their “self-inflicted” injuries were undertaken
based on a Hobson’s choice: either failing to fulfill their professional
obligations by allowing government monitoring or incurring costs to
avoid them. Moreover, issues of causality and redressability are
unlikely to preclude standing because intervening steps and partial
redressability are not factors that defeat standing in this case.
However, this will be a close decision that will, at least in subtext,
require the Court to balance the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights with
the Government’s duty to protect its citizens.

injuries as injuries-in-fact in all government actions).
162. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523–24 (2007); see also Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 186 (2000) (“To the extent that [sanctions]
encourage defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them from committing future
ones, they afford redress to citizen plaintiffs who are injured or threatened with injury as a
consequence of ongoing unlawful conduct.”).
163. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 523–24.
164. Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 51.
165. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 89, at 45.
166. Brief in Opposition, supra note 5, at 26.

